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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of the introduction of an Earning or Learning reform on 
youth crime in Queensland, Australia. The 2006 reform increased learning and reduced 
earning as school participation rose post-reform, while teen employment fell. Empirical 
analysis of detailed administrative data reveals that criminal offending fell significantly 
after enactment of the reform. For males, violent, property and drug crime all declined, 
while the main effect for females was a significant fall in property crime. The property and 
drug crime falls are underpinned by a significant incapacitation effect, with some evidence 
of a persistent crime reduction for young men and women at later ages. Crime reduction is 
concentrated in significant falls in the likelihood of ever offending by marginal 
individuals, rather than lower criminality among recalcitrant persistent offenders. 
 
JEL Keywords:  Youth crime; Earning or Learning reform.   
JEL Classifications:  I2; K42. 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Queensland Police Service, in particular Peter Conroy and Sandra 
Smith, as well as Angela Ferguson and Mark McDonnell from the Department of 
Education and Training. They provided considerable help in negotiating access to their 
respective administrative data sets and enabling individual level data merging. We are also 
grateful to Narelle Sykes and the team in Customised and Microdata Delivery, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Salmaan Syed, Research and Innovation, RMIT and Emma Nelms, 
QUT library. The Editor, two anonymous referees, Brian Bell, Rui Costa, Matteo Sandi 
and participants in presentations at the UK Royal Economic Society meeting in 
Manchester and the Department of Education and Training, Queensland provided very 
helpful comments and suggestions.  
1 
 
Larrikin:  “A boisterous, often badly behaved young man”1 
[Noun, Australian, Oxford Dictionary] 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic research demonstrates that raising the compulsory minimum school leaving age 
leads to a decline in criminality. Empirical evidence has accumulated from a variety of 
settings, including cross-state and over-time comparisons for the US (Lochner and 
Moretti, 2004; Anderson, 2014; Bell, Costa and Machin, 2016, 2017), England and Wales 
(Machin, Marie and Vujic, 2011), Sweden (Hjalmarsson, Holmlund and Lindquist, 2015) 
and elsewhere.
2
 In this research, crime reduction occurs as an unintended consequence of 
policies that raise the minimum school leaving (or dropout) age. It is unintended in that 
the design and enactment of reforms do not specifically target crime reduction, but 
nonetheless appear to induce a sizeable decline. 
 Some of the state based education reforms in the US (see Oreopoulos, 2009, or 
Domnisoru, 2015) provide exemptions from minimum school leaving age legislation 
based on proof of employment. Similarly, more recent reforms aimed at tackling school to 
work transition in other countries broaden the scope of legislation to encourage 
participation in training or employment. The current paper examines one such reform: the 
Earning or Learning reform introduced in the state of Queensland, Australia in 2006. The 
main focus is an analysis of the impact of the reform on criminal behaviour among 
Queensland youth. 
                                                 
1
 The word is often associated with male youth, but there has been study of the female larrikin (see Bellanta, 
2010). This paper studies both male and female criminality among Australian youths. 
2
 See the reviews of Lochner (2011) or Rud et al. (2013) for more examples. 
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 Prior to the reform in Queensland, in 2003 only 72.5 percent of 15-19 year olds 
were in school, well below the national average of 77.3 percent (ABS, 2003). Similarly, 
the proportion of students completing 12 years of education (i.e. completing high school) 
in the state was also low and had been static since 1998. Against a backdrop of low 
education participation rates and poor employment prospects for early school leavers, 
Queensland enacted legislation entitled the Earning or Learning reform in 2006.  
The Earning or Learning reform was designed to increase education, and skill 
levels more broadly, of Queensland youth. The motive for the reform was to better equip 
students for a successful transition into employment or further study. The reform stated 
that: 
 
“.. a young person of the 21st century no longer lives in a world where they 
can leave school at 15 with few qualifications and obtain employment, 
acquiring the necessary skills with on-the-job training. The prospects for 
school leavers today are less promising if they do not possess high levels of 
skills and qualifications and the capacity for lifelong learning.” (Dixon, 2003, 
page 5) 
 
Upon turning age 16 or after completing grade 10, the reform mandated a period of 
compulsory participation. However, rather than simply increase the minimum school 
leaving age, the reform attempted to address diversity of the youth cohort. Thus additional 
schooling, enrolment in a vocational education program or taking up employment 
provided alternative pathways to satisfy the reform. Study of this intervention broadens 
3 
 
prior analysis of the impact of increasing the mandatory minimum school leaving age in 
the US, UK and in other settings. 
The current paper employs individual level administrative data to examine the 
impact of the Queensland Earning or Learning reform on two key issues: the proclivity of 
youth to remain in school, and the probability of committing crime.  The rich nature of the 
matched individual level panel data to which we have access, allows the analysis to shed 
light on the mechanism via which the reform lowers crime and in particular, the role that 
incapacitation plays (i.e. by keeping children in the classroom for longer). 
It is important to note that the individual level crime data is matched only to 
individuals in school, and not to labour market or vocational education outcomes.  The 
complexity of the legislative reform therefore makes it more difficult to focus on the 
causal impact of an exogenous increase of education on criminal activity, the focus of 
much prior crime and education research.
3
 This paper therefore begins by presenting 
survey data based evidence on the impact of the reform on a range of earning and learning 
outcomes, via pre-/post-reform comparisons of education and employment. This is 
followed by the principal focus of the paper, an analysis of the reduced form relationship 
between crime and the Earning or Learning reform. 
In common with the non-education focussed dimension of the Queensland reform, 
there is also a small amount of recent research on the impact of youth intervention 
programs (other than schooling) on crime reduction. For example, Heller (2014) and 
Heller et al. (2017) set up a number of randomised control trials (RCTs) in the US to 
examine a number of Chicago based programs, with a particular emphasis on their scope 
                                                 
3
 From a technical point of view, the exclusion restriction within an instrumental variable (IV) context may 
be violated by potentially different first stage impacts of the earning or learning reform. Whilst intuitively 
the reform is likely to be correlated with the level of schooling, it could also generate crime effects via 
alternative routes, for example by affecting employment or enrolment in vocational education or training. 
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to affect levels of violent crime. Heller (2014) recites an expression used by Cook and 
Ludwig (2011) "Nothing stops a bullet like a job". But despite the sentiment, she argues 
that empirical evidence is not strong in establishing that employment is key to curing 
delinquency. The RCT examines the impact of a summer job program on violent crime, 
Heller reports a significant causal crime reduction. Despite the short-term nature of the 
summer job program (and its associated low cost of implementation) it successfully 
reduced arrests for violent offences. One of the key conclusions was that the success of the 
program is not entirely attributable to incapacitation. 
To preview the paper’s main results, the reform did raise the proportion of youth 
engaging in earning or learning. Delving a little deeper, this comes about via an increase 
in the schooling participation rate, with a partially offsetting fall in the youth employment 
rate. The Earning or Learning reform significantly reduced criminal offending, for both 
males and females. The effects for males are sizable and highly significant for all three 
major crime categories, namely violent, property and drug related. For females, results are 
smaller and the only consistently significant effect is for property crime (although in some 
specifications a drug crime effect is also evident).  
Moreover, part of the reduction in crime is due to an incapacitation effect 
associated with keeping teenagers in school for longer. This plays a significant role in 
property and drug crime, but not violent crime. There is also evidence of the reform 
having a longer run effect, with crime reductions observed at ages after leaving the state 
school system. Finally, the reform consistently and significantly reduces crime for more 
marginal potential offenders. It is concentrated in significant falls in the likelihood of ever 
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offending by marginal individuals, rather than generating lower criminality among 
recalcitrant persistent offenders.
4
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the details 
of the Earning or Learning reform. Given the reform is broader than just an increase in the 
minimum school leaving age, we first employ Survey of Education and Work (SEW) 
micro data to examine the impact of the reform on a spectrum of earning and learning 
outcomes. We then describe the administrative education data that follows individuals 
through the Government funded school sector and document statistical regression results 
showing the impact of the reform on staying on in state school. Section 3 describes the 
matched administrative data on crime and education, together with presenting baseline 
estimates of the reduced form crime specification. Section 4 reports the results from 
studying incapacitation effects, shifts in the crime age profile and changing patterns of 
offender behaviour. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Queensland Earning or Learning Reform and School to Work Transitions 
The Queensland Earning or Learning Reform 
In Queensland the school system consists of 12 years of education (grades 1 to 12). Prior 
to the enactment of the Earning or Learning reform of 2006, students were required to 
attend school until either completing grade 10 or turning 16 whichever occurred first. This 
was referred to as the compulsory school phase. The Earning or Learning reform 
introduced a compulsory participation obligation. After the compulsory school phase, the 
reform mandated that young people participate in a range of activities broadly defined as 
earning or learning for up to an additional two years. Thus, the compulsory participation 
                                                 
4
 This is in line with US findings from Jacob and Lefgren (2003) who also report that school incapacitation 
predominantly reduces crime of marginal individuals. 
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phase required youth to either stay on at school until obtaining a high school Senior 
Certificate
5
; complete a vocational education Certificate III
6
; or participate in paid 
employment for at least 25 hours per week until turning age 17. The current empirical 
analysis focusses on the impact of the reform and in particular, treatment is defined as the 
compulsory participation obligation. This offers an intention-to-treat (ITT) approach to 
studying potential crime reduction for the birth cohorts of individuals affected by the 
reform. 
Australia is of course one of many jurisdictions to have carried out education 
reforms.
7
 Does Queensland and Australia’s reform differ from other interventions? There 
is a considerable prior empirical literature examining the impact of education reforms 
across the globe. As far back as 1946, Sweden and the United Kingdom recognised the 
social benefits of additional years of education. The UK’s first reform introduced in April 
1947, raised the minimum age of compulsory education from 14 to 15 years (see 
Oreopoulos, 2006). In the 1972/73 school year, the UK mandated a further increase in 
minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 (Machin, Marie and Vujic, 2011).  Taken at 
face value the UK legislation was a simple increase in compulsory schooling age, but 
delving beneath the surface it also heralded the introduction of the Education (Work 
Experience) Act. This additional reform enabled Local Education Authorities to organise 
work experience in lieu of the additional final year of schooling. This led to greater 
flexibility, and is in keeping with subsequent Australian and Queensland reforms.  
In a similar vein, Oreopoulos (2009) outlines differences and changes in the 
minimum compulsory school leaving age across states and over time in the United States.  
                                                 
5
 A Senior Certificate is awarded after an individual has completed grade 12. 
6
 A Certificate III is a level three vocational qualification gained either at a high school or at a vocational 
training college.  
7
 The Earning or Learning reform was a national program implemented across all Australian states between 
2006 and 2010 (see ACARA, 2009). 
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He documents a range of exemptions associated with state legislation.  For example, in 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, District of Columbia, Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Washington and Nevada a student may leave 
school earlier upon acquiring parental/school principal permission to participate in paid 
work. In some states, such as Virginia, Kansas and Louisiana a student requires only 
parental consent to leave the school system early. Similarly, there are important state 
differences in enforcement and legal guardian penalties associated with students leaving 
school prior to the compulsory minimum age.  
Given the legislative prevalence of exclusions from the compulsory school 
minimum leaving age, Queensland’s Earning or Learning reform is in practical terms 
different to others.
8
 This is actually an important point as most prior analysis of education 
reforms has focused solely on the impact of the reform on some measure of schooling 
outcomes. If the legislative reform allows employment or some alternative non-school 
based activity in lieu of additional years in school, focussing solely on the latter ignores an 
important part of the behavioural response. This possibility is investigated below. 
Data and Empirical Evidence: Impact of the Reform on Earning and Learning 
The analysis draws upon two data sources to examine the impact of the reform on 
earning and learning outcomes of Queensland youth. The first data source is the Survey of 
Education and Work (SEW) which forms part of the Monthly Population Survey (MPS) 
carried out by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The MPS consists of the Labour 
Force Survey, plus supplementary surveys. The SEW is a biannual survey from 2001-
                                                 
8
 Some more recent legislative changes are, in fact, rather like the Queensland reform. For example, the 
Education and Skills Act 2008 for England and Wales legislated the following provisions: You can leave 
school on the last Friday in June if you will be 16 by the end of the summer holidays. You must then do one 
of the following until you are 18: stay in full-time education, for example at a college; start an 
apprenticeship or traineeship; spend 20 hours or more a week working or volunteering, while in part-time 
education or training. This was introduced nationally in 2013. 
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2011 and annual thereafter with a focus on the transition from education to work (see 
ABS, 2016). 
Data from 2003 through 2009 is studied to examine the impact of the 2006 reform 
on the earning and learning outcomes of individuals aged 15 to 17. Thus a four year 
window is selected which, because the survey is biennial, covers two cross-sections pre- 
and post-reform respectively. Table 1 documents various dimensions of earning and 
learning, presenting means of pre-/post-levels as well as the changes over time for the 
whole sample and sub-divided by gender.   
The first column of Table 1 identifies a significant rise of 2.3 percentage points in 
Earning or Learning across all individuals. Thus, it would appear at first consideration that 
the reform has played a significant role. Full-time learning increased by 5.1 percent, with 
the sub-component in school rising by 7.7 percentage points. The increase in full-time 
learning is smaller than the increase in schooling alone. This reflects a decrease in 
enrolments in all non-school education, and vocational education in particular. The other 
significant contributor to the aggregate change in Earning or Learning is a 2.6 percentage 
point decline in full-time employment. There is also a significant 1.8 percentage point fall 
in the unemployment rate (and an associated fall in labour force participation). Overall, 
the reform significantly increased those staying on at school and decreased employment 
among youth.  
The overall aggregate impact on Earning or Learning differs by gender, with a 
highly significant 3.2 percentage point increase for women versus an insignificant 1.5 
percentage point increase for male youth. This is a priori as expected because pre-reform 
males have a stronger labour market connection and an associated lower schooling 
participation rate. The reform increased full-time education participation for males and 
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females by the same (5.1 percentage point) amount. There is a larger increase in the school 
participation rate for men – of 8.8 versus 6.9 percentage points - from the lower pre-policy 
level for men (of 68.3 percent), combined with a larger decline in employment (3.5 versus 
1.9 percentage points). These are important shifts that are highly relevant for the analysis 
of criminal behaviour reported later in the paper.  
The second data source used to study the in-school aspect of the reform is 
individual level state-wide administrative data from the Department of Education and 
Training (DET). These data tracks the entire population of attendees at all Queensland 
Government funded schools over the period 2002 to 2013. In the current analysis all 
children enrolled in state schools at age 15 and/or grade 10 both before and after the 
reform are tracked until they leave the state school system.
9
 
10
 This is a coherent research 
strategy to follow since the SEW data described in Table 1 documented a significant 
increase in school participation following the introduction of the reform. In fact, the 
dominant impact of the reform was an increase in youth staying on at school.  
The state school sector represents around 70 percent of all school children in 
Queensland, with the remaining 30 percent located in the private school system. The 
Earning or Learning reform introduced the compulsory participation obligation for those 
born in birth cohorts 1990 and beyond. The micro data enable analysis of the impact of the 
Earning or Learning reform on the probability of staying on at school, conditional upon 
being in school in grade 10.  This offers a different margin from, and offers a potentially 
useful counterpoint to, the SEW results, by longitudinally tracking the same individuals to 
see if they stay on to grade 11 or 12. Figure 1 provides an initial description of the impact 
                                                 
9
 Grade retention in Queensland means that about 20 percent of grade 10 children are aged 16 in the relevant 
school year. 
10
 We follow these same cohorts up to age 21 and match with Queensland Police Service administrative data 
in the later crime analysis. 
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of the reform on the likelihood of students staying on at school beyond grade 10. The 
vertical line divides the pre and post reform periods. There is a post-reform increase 
(albeit with some delay as more treated cohorts move through) in the percentage staying 
on to grade 11 or 12 in the school system. Thus as expected the reform induced an 
increase in the level of education participation.  
Empirical analysis of the micro data produced results, shown in Table 2, which 
demonstrate that for males and females together the reform significantly increased the 
probability of staying on to grade 11 or 12 by just over 2 percentage points. In conjunction 
with Figure 1, which illustrates increases in this percentage separately by gender, this 
shows that in school education participation increased after the introduction of the Earning 
or Learning reform. The results in the Table confirm the effect to be larger for men than 
women, which matches the findings from the SEW data. 
 
3. Crime and the Earning or Learning Reform  
Data 
The rest of this study uses Queensland administrative data matched at the individual level 
across state agencies, Department of Education and Training (DET) and the Queensland 
Police Service (QPS). Thus, we have individual record data for the entire population of 
attendees at all Queensland Government funded schools, together with matched individual 
criminal offence data for the period 2002 to 2013.
11
 The focus is on males and females 
aged 15-21. The precise sample structure is shown in Table 3, where the treatment group 
cells - that is those affected by the Earning or Learning reform - are in bold. Data 
                                                 
11
 For some examples of other research that matches school data to crime records in the US, albeit with a 
different research focus, see Deming (2011) or Billings, Deming and Rockoff (2014).  
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collection begins for those in school from 2002 onwards, thus the cohort/age structure is 
not completely balanced. In the statistical analysis, we begin with the unbalanced sample, 
but then move to consider balanced samples in a narrow discontinuity window 
surrounding the reform. 
The crime data refers to alleged criminal offences, and so the focus is on whether 
an individual in a given year is an alleged offender. An alleged offender is a person who 
has allegedly committed a crime and has been processed for that offence by arrest, caution 
or warrant of apprehension. These data are matched at the individual level to the 
Queensland school data. In the latter, we observe individuals until they leave school. Thus, 
a major advantage relative to that adopted in some of the previous literature is that the 
matching of education and criminal offence data occurs at the individual level. The same 
individuals are followed through time in the state education system and to later ages 
beyond, simultaneously tracking alleged criminal offences.  
Descriptive Analysis 
Figure 2 shows the cross-cohort evolution of youth crime. The Figure shows 
offending rates by crime type and gender for 15-17 year olds, with the vertical line 
distinguishing the pre/post reform period. The three main identified crime types represent 
violent, property and drug offences.
12
 As the Figure makes clear, all three categories of 
crime are more prevalent for males than females. The main takeaway is that crime appears 
to decline after the reform was introduced. There are some variations across gender with 
significant reductions in all three crime types for males, but only for property and drug 
crimes among females. 
                                                 
12
 Violent offences are:  murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, sex offences, assaults and robbery. 
Property crimes are: theft, burglary and criminal damage. Drug offences are a single group by themselves. 
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Table 4 shows summary statistics for all crime in the full unbalanced data, for the 
expanded age sample 15 through 21. The Table also reports results broken down by 
gender and major crime category for the pre- and post-reform cohorts, together with the 
change between the two. The Table illustrates similar crime patterns before and after 
implementation of the Earning or Learning reform for the wider sample vis-a-vis school 
age individuals shown in Figure 2. The one exception is property crime for females, which 
documents a fall among the 15-17 year olds considered in the Figure, but does not drop 
post-reform in Table 4. This will be considered in more detail below when treatment is 
allowed to vary with age. Overall, Figure 2 and Table 4 show the salient descriptive 
features of the basic trends in the data. These obviously underpin the statistical 
investigation of crime, to which we now turn. 
Crime Reduced Forms 
 The main statistical analysis involves estimating the parameters of the crime 
reduced form, observed for individual i from birth cohort c in time period t: 
Cict = θELic +γXict + f(a, t) + εit (1) 
 
where C denotes crime, X is a set of control variables (gender and the number of 
observations per individuals as for some of the analysis data is unbalanced)), f(a, t) is a 
function of the individual’s age (a) and year (t), and ε is an error term. The key parameter 
of interest is θ, the estimated coefficient on the Earning or Learning reform variable EL, 
which is defined by birth cohort as previously described. In most specifications – with any 
exceptions noted below – f(a, t) = αt-c + αt is modelled by a full set of age (where a = t – c) 
and year dummies αt-c and αt. 
Table 5 reports a number of estimates from different specifications that model the 
probability of being an offender for any given type of crime. The Table presents results 
13 
 
across 3 different samples. All samples cover individuals aged 15-21 and calendar years 
2002 to 2013. Separate results are provided pooled by gender and separately for males and 
females. The first column provides results for the unbalanced panel birth cohorts 1984 to 
1998; the second column is again birth cohorts 1984 to 1998 where each individual is 
observed in the panel at least six times and the final column is the discontinuity sample 
which is composed of three birth cohorts pre-reform and three post reform (i.e. birth 
cohorts 1987 to 1992).  
The results in the Table are consistent across specifications and samples, with the 
Earning or Learning reform always having a significant negative impact on crime. Thus, 
in these baseline results, the reform significantly decreased the probability of crime. The 
impact for males is at least three times higher (in terms of reduced offending rates) than 
for females. It is also higher for males when expressed as a percentage effect of the pre-
reform mean.  
The results for the final column, the discontinuity sample in the time window close 
to the reform, are smaller than for the other specifications, but nonetheless show a sizable 
crime reduction following from the Earning or Learning reform.
13
 Relative to the pre-
reform mean offence rate of 3.9 percentage points, the discontinuity sample estimate crime 
reduction for all 15-21 year olds is 10.3 percent. Corresponding percent reductions 
(relative to their respective pre-reform means) for males and females are 10.8 and 8.9 
percent. 
Table 6 shows results for the discontinuity sample by type of crime and gender. 
The results for men suggest that across all crime types the effect of the reform is 
                                                 
13
 Addition of a linear cohort variable (suitably rescaled so that it models a pre-cohort trend) did not 
substantively alter the pattern of results. For all individuals the estimate became -0.338 with an associated 
standard error of 0.084, and for males and females the estimates (standard errors) were respectively -0.517 
(0.148) and -0.163 (0.080). 
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consistently negative and significant at the 5 percent level. For females the reform is 
significant at the 10 percent level for property crime. The gender differences show the 
reform has a larger effect for men than women. To offer some additional context, 
estimates broken down into more detailed crime classifications within the violent and 
property crime groupings are given in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
Placebo Analysis 
 In examining a policy change like the 2006 Earning or Learning reform it is 
important to consider if the social environment remains the same pre and post the change. 
The analysis to date has already included age and year fixed effects to mitigate time 
invariant unobservables that may be correlated with age and year. In addition, we have 
also considered various placebo analyses to ensure there are not shifts either side of the 
year (2006) of treatment. For example, setting up a “fake” policy reform in 2004 and then 
re-estimating the specifications given in Tables 5 and 6 produced statistically insignificant 
results. These results from the 2004 placebo for the Table 5 crime specifications are 
reported in Table A2 of the Appendix.
14
 
  
4. Understanding the Crime Impact 
In this section, we discuss additional empirical findings in an attempt to try to better 
understand the mechanisms via which the Earning or Learning reform directly affected 
crime. We begin by looking at whether incapacitation (i.e. keeping youth off the streets 
                                                 
14
 There was a change in policy that occurred in the period after the Earning or Learning reform where 
alterations were made to the Queensland Police move-on laws in 2008. This change expanded the options 
available to a police officer when coming into contact with a potential offender. Under the new laws an 
offender could be warned, arrested, or, just directed to move-on; i.e. to go home. The former two actions 
would appear in the police records, but, being told to go home would not. The action a police officer chooses 
thus has the potential to reduce the number of offenders in the police data and lead to a resultant downward 
bias in crime analysis results.  However, eyeballing the time series plots of offending confirms that it is hard 
to see any noticeable change in levels of crime occurring at this juncture. 
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and in the classroom or workplace due to the Earning or Learning reform) reduces crime.  
Second, we look in more detail at the way in which crime-age profiles shift in response to 
the reform. Third, we look at whether the reform results in reduced offending levels for 
more or less marginal potential criminals. 
Incapacitation 
One clear avenue for possible crime reduction emerges if the reform mandates 
youth to be in a supervised environment rather than roaming the streets, the so called 
incapacitation effect. There is a body of evidence to support this which uses plausibly 
exogenous changes in the length of the school day or exploits random days in which 
schools do not open, to identify incapacitation effects (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003, and 
Luallen, 2006).
15
 Also, Anderson (2014) examines whether students affected by a dropout 
reform show different responses by age. 
In similar vein to Anderson (2014) and Bell, Costa and Machin (2017), the basic 
statistical specification outlined earlier is generalised to explore whether the treatment 
effect of the reform varies by age. For this analysis a full set of interactions between EL 
and the age dummies αt-c are added to equation (1). Table 7 shows the estimated 
coefficients on the interactions. The results demonstrate that the reform effects differ by 
age. Reassuringly there is little effect at age 15, and at subsequent ages the negative 
effects of the reform begin to appear. For males, the impact of the reform kicks in at age 
17 across all categories of violent, property and drug crime. The impact of the reform 
reaches a peak at age 19 for violent and property crime and age 18 for drug crime. For the 
male crimes, there is not a significant reform effect at ages 20 and 21, except for drug 
                                                 
15
 Prior to this research focussed on causality, there were earlier (non-causal) estimates of the impact of time 
spent in school on crime (see, for example, Gottfredson, 1985, Farrington et al., 1986 or Witte and Tauchen, 
1994). Hjalmarsson (2008) studied the impact of being arrested and incarcerated before finishing school on 
the probability of graduating high school, reporting there to be a strong negative association.  
16 
 
crimes. For females the reform does not have a significant role in terms of violent crime 
apart from at age 19. For property and drug crime the impact of the reform begins and 
simultaneously reaches a peak at age 17 and 19 respectively. Overall, the pattern suggests 
a more prominent role for incapacitation in property and drug crime than in violent crime. 
Shifts in Crime-Age Profiles 
The second, closely related, way in which we study incapacitation builds upon the 
insight that crime onset often begins in the teenage years and that criminal behaviour 
peaks in the late teenage years (as in the life course approaches to crime described in, for 
example, Sampson, and Laub, 1993, 2005). Thus, for many crimes one sees an inverse U-
shape in the crime-age profile.
16
 If the incapacitation effect reduces criminal activity at 
these crucial ages, it may in addition generate a persistently lower crime rate as the cohort 
ages, since some of the cohort members will have avoided going down the wrong path at a 
crucial age.  
The estimates shown in Table 7, when combined with the pre-reform crime age 
profiles, can be used to focus in on how the crime-age profile changes before and after the 
Earning or Learning reform (see Bell, Costa and Machin, 2017, for a framework that links 
changing crime age profiles to changes in dropout age). Figure 3 shows this for the three 
main types of crime separately by gender. There is evidence of an incapacitation effect for 
property and drug crime for both genders, with crime reductions for incapacitation ages 
16-18. There is also some evidence of longer run persistent crime reductions, though they 
                                                 
16
 Almost two hundred years ago, Quetelet (1831) showed a peak in the late teens for crime in early 
nineteenth-century France. A mass of subsequent research has confirmed the strong age-crime pattern, with 
crime peaking in the late teens and declining with age quite rapidly. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) 
proposed that crime-age profiles are broadly invariant over time and across demographic groups. Such a 
view has been challenged empirically by a number of authors. Examples are Greenberg (1985) who presents 
evidence that both the peak crime age and the rate of subsequent decline differs across crime types, 
localities, race and gender. Similarly Hansen (2003) shows that the crime-age profile differs for those who 
leave school at the compulsory school leaving age and those who remain in education. 
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generally disappear by age 21 (male drug crime being the exception). The pattern is rather 
different for violent crime, with no reform effects for 15 and 16 year olds, but a downward 
shift from age 17 for men and age 18 for women. There are longer run reductions after 
school dropout age, but these also tend to fade by age 21. 
Changes in Offending Behaviour 
The final set of issues we study are enabled because of the rich nature of the 
longitudinal data which follows the same individuals from different birth cohorts over 
time. Specifically, it is possible to examine whether there are pre- and post- reform 
changes in the single or multiple offending behaviour of individuals who are observed 
between ages 15 and 21. This permits a consideration of whether crime reductions are 
more likely to arise from a change in behaviour of those on the margins of crime 
participation in their teenage years, or a reduction in criminality among more persistent 
offenders.  
Table 8 reports results examining the impact of the reform on three key measures 
of criminal activity. The first considers whether or not an individual ever offends between 
ages 15 and 21.  The second and third look only at offenders and ask whether, conditional 
upon being an offender, individuals offend in more than one year of the seven in which 
they are observed, and as a measure of prolific offending whether they commit an offence 
in five or more years. The results reported in the Table distinguishes among the three 
broad categories of crime and separately by gender.  
The clearest result that emerges from Table 8 is that, with the exception of violent 
crime for females, the dominant impact of the reform is upon the likelihood of ever 
offending. Strong significant reductions occur for the probability of ever offending for 
males for violent, property and drug crime, and for females for property and drug crime.  
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There is much less evidence of effects on multiple offending, either for offending in more 
than one year or for the prolific offenders committing crime in five of more years. In fact, 
all of the latter prolific offence effects are insignificantly different from zero. And, at the 
same time, five of the six multiple (more than once) effects are also insignificant, the one 
exception being a reduction in multiple offending for drug crimes by males.  Overall, it is 
evident from the longitudinal analysis that the primary impact of the Earning or Learning 
reform is a reduction in offending by those on the margins of crime, rather than from 
generating lower criminality among more frequent offenders. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The focus of this paper is on whether Queensland’s 2006 Earning or Learning reform 
reduced criminality among the young. The answer is in the affirmative, as offending 
behaviour is seen to significantly fall after introduction of the reform. This is established 
from analysis of rich administrative data covering several cohorts of all individuals 
attending state school between 2002 and 2013. The reform itself significantly increased 
earning or learning participation. The compositional changes underpinning this feature 
increased school participation and reduced employment. Crime falls are observed for both 
males and females, with more sizable effects emerging for violent, property and drug 
crimes for the former and smaller falls in property (and in some, but not all, specifications 
in drug crime) for the latter. 
Probing the patterns of crime reduction in more detail reveals an incapacitation 
effect, whereby teenagers are compelled to remain in school longer, and also a longer run 
effect that persists after the schooling years. Digging deeper reveals that this balance of 
larger crime reductions for those who are kept in school operates mostly through a 
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reduction in property or drug crime, rather than violent related offences. Finally, the crime 
reductions seem to operate through permanent deterrence for those affected by the reform 
as there is a large drop in the proportion of young men and women who ever offend 
between ages 15 and 21, but little change in multiple offending that occurs pre- and post-
reform. Overall, it seems that, as one might intuitively expect, the Earning or Learning 
reform brought about desistence in crime from youth on the margins of offending in their 
teenage years, rather than reductions in criminality among persistent offenders. 
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Figure 1: Percent Staying on in State School 
 
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
S
ta
y
in
g
 o
n
 i
n
 S
ta
te
 S
c
h
o
o
l
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
 
Males Females
Birth Cohort
Staying on in State School
Notes: Based on DET showing percentage of grade 10 individuals in each birth cohort who 
stay on in school to grade 11 or 12.  Pre-reform birth cohorts are to the left of the vertical line, 
whilst post-reform birth cohorts are to the right. 
24 
 
Figure 2: Youth Crime Incidence Before and After the Earning or Learning Education Reform 
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Figure 3: Youth Crime Age Profiles Before and After the Earning or Learning Education Reform 
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Table 1: Pre and Post Reform Earning or Learning Percentages 
  
Survey of Education and Work, 15-17 year olds, 2003 and 2005 to 2007 and 2009 
 
  
All 
 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change 
          
Earning or Learning 93.1 95.4 2.3 (1.1) 93.5 95.0 1.5 (1.5) 92.7 95.9 3.2 (1.5) 
          
Full-Time Education 78.0 83.1 5.1 (1.8) 76.0 81.1 5.1 (2.7) 80.0 85.1 5.1 (2.5) 
In School 70.1 77.8 7.7 (2.0) 68.3 77.1 8.8 (2.9) 71.8 78.7 6.9 (2.8) 
Vocational Education 2.6 1.6 -1.0 (0.7) 2.7 1.1 -1.6 (0.9) 2.6 2.3 -0.3 (0.1) 
          
Employed, Not in Full-Time Education 15.0 12.4 -2.6 (1.6) 17.4 13.9 -3.5 (2.4) 12.7 10.8 -1.9 (2.1) 
Unemployed, Not in Full-Time Education 3.9 2.1 -1.8 (0.8) 4.4 3.2 -1.2 (1.3) 3.5 0.9 -2.6 (1.0) 
Out of Labour Force, Not in Full-Time Education 3.0 2.5 -0.5 (0.8) 2.2 1.8 -0.4 (0.1) 3.8 3.2 -0.6 (1.2) 
          
Sample size 838 1092 1930 413 562 975 425 530 955 
          
 
 
 
  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2: Staying on to Grade 11 or 12 in State School 
 
 
 
 
[Probability of Staying on to Grade 11 or 12 in State 
School if in State School in Year 10] X 100 
 
 All Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Earning or Learning Reform 2.122 
(0.124) 
2.434 
(0.182) 
1.791 
(0.068) 
Male 3.461 
(0.119) 
- - 
Age 16 in Year 10 -9.694 
(0.150) 
-9.062 
(0.208) 
-10.055 
(0.216) 
    
Sample Size 376251 194191 182110 
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Table 3: Sample Structure of Age Group by Birth Cohort, Unbalanced Panel 
  Age 
Birth Cohort 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 All Ages 
         
1984 - - - 7813 7810 7812 7810 31245 
1985 - - 29634 29648 29659 29665 29665 148271 
1986 - 34993 34994 35009 35021 35024 35023 210064 
1987 39382 39377 39387 39402 39411 39412 39936 275767 
1988 42426 42341 42445 42461 42467 42464 42445 297139 
1989 45878 45876 45878 45911 45902 45885 45871 321201 
1990 54523 54502 54522 54521 54518 54508 54480 381574 
1991 56606 56602 56627 56642 56644 56640 56640 396401 
1992 59993 60020 60030 60052 60060 60061 60065 420281 
1993 59723 59724 59749 59774 59778 59778 - 358256 
1994 59539 59525 59542 59554 59565 - - 297725 
1995 59292 59306 59332 59349 - - - 237279 
1996 58095 58118 58124 - - - - 174337 
1997 56945 56952 - - - - - 113897 
1998 55108 - - - - - - 55108 
         
All Birth Cohorts 647510 627416 600264 550136 490835 431249 371395 3718815 
         
     
Notes: Cohorts and age groups affected by the 2006 Earning or Learning reform are in bold. 
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Table 4: Pre and Post Reform Offending Rates (Percent) 
  
Unbalanced, Ages 15-21, Cohorts 1984 to 1998, Years 2002 to 2013 
 
  
All 
 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Change 
          
Any Crime 3.834 3.352 -0.482 (0.030) 5.721 4.803 -0.918 (0.052) 1.898 1.849 -0.049 (0.028) 
          
Violent Crime 0.788 0.790 0.002 (0.012) 1.215 1.148 -0.067 (0.021) 0.350 0.420 0.070 (0.011) 
Property Crime 2.358 2.152 -0.206 (0.023) 3.452 3.008 -0.444 (0.040) 1.236 1.267 0.031 (0.022) 
Drug Crime 1.417 1.107 -0.310 (0.013) 2.245 1.750 -0.495 (0.028) 0.567 0.441 -0.127 (0.014) 
          
Sample size 1338210 2308605 3718815 677748 1210980 1888728 660462 1169625 1830087 
Number of Individuals 254876 520287 720619 129261 264575 365982 125615 255712 354637 
          
 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Offending Reduced Forms 
  
Pr[Any Crime] X 100 
 
 Unbalanced, Ages 15-21,  
Cohorts 1984 to 1998, 
Years 2002 to 2013 
6 or More Observations, Ages 15-21,  
Cohorts 1984 to 1998, 
Years 2002 to 2013 
Discontinuity +/-3, Ages 15-21,  
Cohorts 1987 to 1992, 
Years 2002 to 2013 
    
A. All    
Earning or Learning Reform -0.610 (0.060) -0.555 (0.070) -0.403 (0.082) 
Male 3.266 (0.028) 3.442 (0.034) 3.451 (0.39) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 3718815 2658352 2090637 
Number of Individuals 720619 393375 298788 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 3.834 3.839 3.931 
    
B. Males    
Earning or Learning Reform -0.991 (0.105) -0.833 (0.123) -0.627 (0.142) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1888728 1350262 1061494 
Number of Individuals 365982 199820 151709 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 5.721 5.790 5.803 
    
C. Females    
Earning or Learning Reform -0.219 (0.057) -0.269 (0.066) -0.178 (0.077) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1830087 1308090 1029143 
Number of Individuals 354637 193555 147079 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 1.898 1.942 1.995 
    
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Offending Reduced Forms by Crime Type 
  
Pr[Crime] X 100 
 
  
Discontinuity +/-3, Ages 15-21, Cohorts 1987 to 1992, Years 2002 to 2013 
 
 Violent Crime Property Crime Drug Crime 
    
A. Males    
    
Earning or Learning Reform -0.122 (0.060) -0.323 (0.107) -0.398 (0.080) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1061494 1061494 1061494 
Number of Individuals 151709 151709 151709 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 1.251 3.553 2.216 
    
B. Females    
    
Earning or Learning Reform -0.027 (0.031) -0.102 (0.058) -0.051 (0.041) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1029143 1029143 1029143 
Number of Individuals 147079 147079 147079 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 0.370 1.324 0.565 
    
  
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Offending Reduced Forms by Crime Type, Age Varying Reform Impacts 
  
Discontinuity +/-3, Ages 15-21, Cohorts 1987 to 1992, Years 2002 to 2013 
 
 Violent Crime Property Crime Drug Crime 
    
A. Males    
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=15 0.022 (0.099) -0.163 (0.180) -0.051 (0.119) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=16 -0.079 (0.102) -0.211 (0.182) -0.186 (0.127) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=17 -0.257 (0.095) -0.424 (0.164) -0.478 (0.119) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=18 -0.172 (0.092) -0.556 (0.153) -0.585 (0.117) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=19 -0.225 (0.088) -0.654 (0.143) -0.540 (0.118) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=20 -0.126 (0.089) -0.185 (0.142) -0.437 (0.122) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=21 -0.031 (0.092) -0.055 (0.143) -0.409 (0.130) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1061494 1061494 1061494 
Number of Individuals 151709 151709 151709 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 1.251 3.553 2.216 
    
B. Females    
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=15 0.026 (0.058) -0.112 (0.114) 0.020 (0.062) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=16 0.043 (0.057) -0.096 (0.111) -0.035 (0.067) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=17 -0.014 (0.051) -0.257 (0.097) -0.032 (0.063) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=18 -0.059 (0.048) -0.220 (0.085) -0.087 (0.058) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=19 -0.093 (0.046) -0.182 (0.078) -0.129 (0.061) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=20 -0.058 (0.047) 0.003 (0.078) -0.052 (0.063) 
Earning or Learning Reform X Age=21 0.001 (0.046) 0.090 (0.078) -0.028 (0.066) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1029143 1029143 1029143 
Number of Individuals 147079 147079 147079 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 0.370 1.324 0.565 
    
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 8: Change in Individual Offender Behaviour Before and After Reform 
  
Discontinuity +/-3, Ages 15-21, Cohorts 1987 to 1992, Years 2002 to 2013 
 
  
Ever Offends X 100 
 
 
Offends More Than One Year| 
Ever Offends X 100 
 
 
Offends Five or More Years| 
Ever Offends X 100 
 Violent Crime Property Crime Drug Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Drug Crime Violent Crime Property Crime Drug Crime 
          
A. Males          
          
Earning or Learning Reform -0.546 (0.119) -2.480 (0.168) -2.411 (0.146) -0.218 (0.871) 0.673 (0.652) -1.994 (0.744) -0.000 (0.166) -0.051 (0.284) 0.033 (0.137) 
          
Number of Individuals 151709 151709 151709 9305 20124 14334 9305 20124 14334 
Pre-Reform Mean 6.429 14.616 10.764 26.225 36.622 32.393 0.723 4.633 7.150 
          
B. Females          
          
Earning or Learning Reform -0.083 (0.070) -0.778 (0.123) -0.745 (0.083) 1.779 (1.357) 1.009 (0.813) 0.100 (0.125) 0.076 (0.182) -0.241 (0.242) 0.106 (0.190) 
          
Number of Individuals 147079 147079 147079 2978 9334 3997 2978 9334 3997 
Pre-Reform Mean 2.069 6.777 3.124 17.742 20.834 21.115 0.228 1.676 3.711 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Offending Reduced Forms by Detailed Crime Type 
 
 
 
 
Pr[Crime] X 100
♥
 
 
  
Discontinuity +/-3, Ages 15-21, Cohorts 1987 to 1992, Years 2002 to 2013 
 
 
 Violent Crime Property Crime Drug Crime 
 Murder or 
Attempted 
Murder or 
Manslaughter
♥
 
Sex Assault Robbery Theft  Burglary Criminal 
Damage 
Drug 
         
A. Males         
Earning or Learning Reform 0.048 (0.048) -0.026 (0.020) -0.092 (0.052) -0.028 (0.021) -0.228 (0.081) -0.159 (0.058) -0.057 (0.062) -0.398 (0.080) 
         
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1061494 1061494 1061494 1061494 1061494 1061494 1061494 1061494 
Number of Individuals 151709 151709 151709 151709 151709 151709 151709 151709 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.137 0.181 0.955 0.177 2.271 1.151 1.464 2.216 
         
B. Females         
Earning or Learning Reform -0.022 (0.019) 0.001 (0.005) -0.027 (0.030) 0.000 (0.001) -0.082 (0.051) -0.001 (0.019) -0.019 (0.023) -0.051 (0.041) 
         
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1029143 1029143 1029143 1029143 1029143 1029143 1029143 1029143 
Number of Individuals 147079 147079 147079 147079 147079 147079 147079 147079 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.009 0.010 0.338 0.029 1.118 0.162 0.243 0.565 
         
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. All coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 or by 1000 if denoted by ♥. 
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Table A2: Offending Reduced Forms for Placebo Two Years (2004) Prior to the Earning or Learning Reform 
 
 Pr[Any Crime] X 100 
 Unbalanced, Ages 15-21,  
Cohorts 1984 to 1998, 
Years 2002 to 2013 
6 or More Observations, Ages 15-21,  
Cohorts 1984 to 1998, 
Years 2002 to 2013 
Discontinuity +/-3, Ages 15-21,  
Cohorts 1987 to 1992, 
Years 2002 to 2013 
    
A. All    
Earning or Learning Reform -0.056 (0.075) 0.084 (0.080) 0.097 (0.084) 
Male 3.266 (0.028) 3.442 (0.034) 3.451 (0.39) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes No 
Sample Size 3718815 2658352 2090637 
Number of Individuals 720619 393375 298788 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 3.840 3.974 4.140 
    
B. Males    
Earning or Learning Reform -0.130 (0.131) 0.122 (0.140) 0.152 (0.147) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes No 
Sample Size 1888728 1350262 1061494 
Number of Individuals 365982 199820 151709 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 5.758 5.922 6.045 
    
C. Females    
Earning or Learning Reform 0.025 (0.070) 0.054 (0.073) 0.052 (0.076) 
    
Age, Year and Number of Observation Effects Yes Yes No 
Sample Size 1830087 1308090 1029143 
Number of Individuals 354637 193555 147079 
Pre-Reform Mean of Dependent Variable 1.875 1.964 2.14 
    
 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. 
 
